Wage Process:
This paper offers an explanation for recent wage developments and current wage prospects and, in particular, examines the lack of responsiveness of wages in the short run to anti-inflation policies. Wages are approached from three directions. The first approach involves an inspection of relative wages among industries. Many economists have argued that when the traditional relationships among industry wages shift, the attempt to restore customary differentials can cause upward pressure on wages. An analysis of relative wages also identifies the contribution that individual sectors make to particular problems. The second approach concerns the recent major coliective bargaining settlements and their implications for near-term wage trends. Specific attention is paid to the pattern emerging from the steel settlement and to the spread of escalator clauses. The third approach uses a simplified wage equation to forecast the near-term outlook for wage inflation.2 The wage equations estimated here have a decidedly accelerationist look. If long lags are permitted between price and wage adjustments, the coefficient on the long-run price term is close to unity.
As a consequence of the highly structured and institutionalized nature of the labor market, wages respond with a relatively long lag to their economic determinants. The result is that the ability of government policy to influence wage inflation over short intervals is seriously circumscribedwhether it relies on fiscal or monetary tools or on wage-price controls. Policy swings of the "stop-go" variety are unlikely to reduce the inflation rate. Due to the length of the contract period, as well as the nonlinear response of wages to unemployment, a policy aimed at causing sharp but deep downturns is probably less efficient in controlling inflation than one aimed at shallow but longer intervals of slow real growth.
Relative Wages
In a study of the overall wage outlook, relative or interindustry wages are of interest because distortions in traditional relationships may cause upward pressure on wages.
As a starting point for an analysis of interindustry wages and as a method of defining the traditional wage structure, I have reestimated my inter-2. The specification of the Phillips curve used in this paper and its advantages for forecasting purposes are discussed in the section on wage equations. where U is the unemployment rate, P is the rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price index, G and K are dummies for the guidepost and 3. Interindustry wages within manufacturing are used because of the relatively high quality of the data (the specific series is average hourly earnings excluding overtime on the two-digit level of the standard industrial classification) and the good mix of high-and low-wage industries. Korean War periods, respectively, and T is a time trend. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The equations are estimated using Almon lags, and the coefficients shown are the sum of the weights. The lags are quite long; the average lags are approximately three years and the full lags are five years.4 The major insight from this approach is that the traditional interindustry wage structure varies systematically over the cycle. The reason is rooted largely in the fact that the high-wage sectors of the economy (which are largely unionized) have a longer planning or contract period than the low-wage, more competitive, sectors. The planning or contract period is the interval over which the wage of the firm, including guaranteed periodic increases, is fixed or predetermined; it generates both lags of adjustment, equal to the length of the contract, and lags due to expectational effects. As a consequence of the longer forecasting horizon of the high-wage sectors, they tend during periods of historically low unemployment and high inflation to underestimate the economy-wide rate of wage change with the result that the wage dispersion narrows. (Conversely, it widens when labor markets are slack.5)
The period of interest can be divided into three short intervals: the precontrols period, 1969-71; Phases I and II; and finally, Phases III and IV. 5. Throughout the paper I use the terms "high-wage sector" and "unionized sector" interchangeably. There are, however, differences and the theory relates more directly to high-wage industries. Specifically, in some unionized industries the union is weak, largely where the product market is competitive and national in scope. The precontrols period was marked by rapidly increasing wages, with the high-wage, unionized sectors receiving by far the largest increases. This development is reflected in the relatively large first-year union-wage adjustments shown in Table 1 , which also gives life-of-contract wage adjustments. For comparison, Table 2 It has been suggested that wage "distortions," or changes in interindustry wage differentials, may be a factor determining the rate of wage inflation.9 The model of relative wages suggests that, rather than being an independent package may find it costly indeed. For example, if a deep recession were to develop and succeed in reducing the inflation rate to 3 percent, the steel settlement would still lead to an increase in wage rates of approximately 22 percent over three years (excluding the deferred increases). Hence, although the escalator clause ensures some flexibility in the wage settlement, the protected increase in real wages is well above the historical rate observed during recessions. As in previous downturns, rising unemployment and declining inflation will widen the interindustry wage structure as increases in the more competitive industries become smaller while the highwage sectors are locked into more generous contracts.
At present it appears that, with two exceptions, the steel contract will set the pace for other settlements due to expire in 1974 and early 1975.14 The first exception is the coal industry, where the competitive pressures inherent in its unique current position may well mean a wage settlement higher than the prevailing pattern. The size of the settlement will largely reflect the rapid rise in the demand for coal workers operating against a labor supply that is likely to be inelastic as a consequence of the nature of the work. Second, the railroad contract remains, as always, unpredictable. As a consequence of their uniqueness, however, neither of these two negotiations is likely to have important spillover effects on wages within the unionized sector.15
Although the steel pattern may represent the upper bound of wage contracts, a particularly strong point is the degree of inflation protection built into the escalator provision. In other contracts the level of protection is generally lower. If the next few years witness much less inflation, the gap between the steel pattern and other contracts will be reduced. -The wage data of Table 1 exclude escalator increases that are not automatically guaranteed.16 Hence, they represent the zero-inflation case, and set the lower bound of major wage settlements in the unionized sector. Unfortunately, the available data do not permit an accurate estimate of 14. Most of the major contracts for 1974 have already been negotiated. The same was true at this time in 1971, when Phase I was introduced.
15. It is obvious that strikes in either of these industries could have a severe impact on the economy.
16. Guaranteed escalator increases are a type of deferred increase in that they automatically come into effect regardless of the rate of inflation. These increases are considered part of the increases called for by the escalator formula when the inflation rate is greater than zero. deferred wage increases, including escalators, in the union contracts that will be in force over the next few years.17
Unions (or the high-wage sectors) have a major impact on the inflation problem in that they serve to lock important sectors of the economy into a given wage pattern that may run counter to government goals or to strong cyclical swings in the economy. Whereas the discrete timing works on the side of wage restraint when inflationary pressures are building up (as in 1965-69 and 1972-73), it prevents a prompt slowdown in wage inflation when the government moves into the "stop" phase of the "stop-go" syndrome.18 These factors, as well as the potential for important discontinuities that can arise from the formation of expectations, the bunching of contracts in certain years, and spillovers among contracts, suggest that attempts to bring down the inflation rate will cost less if pursued gradually, over a relatively extended period.19
Assuming the economy does slow down, relative wages will continue to widen as wage changes in the more rapidly responding competitive sectors slow while those in the high-wage sectors remain at the higher level dictated by their contracts. Without escalator clauses, the current pattern would pose a greater problem for policymakers; presumably the fixed wage gains would have been larger and there would be considerably more pressure for monetary and fiscal policy simply to validate the higher expected inflation rate. The potential problem in the current pattern, even including the escalator clauses, is that the protected increases in real wages, 18. This point is analyzed in some detail in Ross and Wachter, "Wage Determination."
The most current analysis on the impact of escalator clauses is Jerome M. Staller and Loren M. Solnick, "Effect of Escalators on Wages in Major Contracts
19. Although a gradual and prolonged slowdown in real growth may be more effective than a steep and short recession, the burden of unemployment that the two impose may fall on different groups. In a sustained period of slow real growth (below the potential growth rate), the "bumping" process, in which the skilled workers displaced in a particularly hard-hit industry replace the unskilled workers in a less vulnerable industry, will have more time to evolve. These distributional questions must be considered and a mechanism for spreading the sacrifices among all members of society developed. The lack of such a mechanism is a major reason why previous anti-inflation battles have not been sustainable. which are not responsive to interperiod changes in economic conditions, will make it more difficult to slow inflation and will impose what will appear to be a "cost-push" element stemming from wages in the unionized sectors.
Wage Equations
This section presents wage equations using the official unemployment and inflation rates as independent variables, in order to forecast near-term changes in wage inflation. The previous sections stressed the lags in the wage determination process. including myself, see relative wages and money illusion as the determining influences. The result is that constructed variables may confound unemployment and inflation effects so that the elasticities of wage changes with respect to the two official variables may be difficult to disentangle from one another.2' PRICE AND UNEMPLOYMENT VARIABLES Table 3 presents estimates from several wage equations. For the price term, the consumer price index (CPI), the private nonfarm deflator (PNFD), and the private consumption deflector (PCON) were tested. The PNFD performed marginally better than the PCON and significantly better than the CPI. The variable was entered, without experimentation, with a lag of twelve quarters, beginning with observation t -1. The lag structures had a mean lag of over five quarters with statistically significant weights extending into the third year.22 The lag structure for equation (3) of Table 3 is presented in Table 4 .
The long-run coefficients on both PNFD and PCON were close to unity in all of these quasi reduced-form equations. Only the coefficient of CPI was significantly below unity when entered as a distributed lag. (When the price term was entered without lags, all the coefficients were around 0.5.) The finding of a price coefficient of unity in the best-fitting equations strongly supports the accelerationist view of the inflation process. Accelera- Table 3 Table 5 demonstrates, both equations forecast a higher rate of wage inflation through 1975:4 for all possible inflationunemployment scenarios. In fact, if only a moderate slowdown develops and inflation slows to an annual rate of 10 percent and the unemployment rate remains below 6 percent until the end of 1975:4, then the rate of wage inflation will rise throughout the forecasted period, reaching an annual rate of over 12 percent by the final quarter. Even in the face of a steep downturn, the wage situation appears bleak. With inflation falling rapidly to an annualized rate of 6 percent by the final quarter of 1975 and the unemployment rate rising to 7 percent, the annual rate of wage inflation, after peaking in 1975:2, is still at 10 percent at the end of 1975. A question raised by this simulation is whether the rate of inflation is likely to fall to 6 percent if the rate of wage change remains at 10 percent. This consideration suggests that the simulations in the first two banks of Table 5 are likely to be more realistic than the other two. The long lags in the wage process, and the feedback from wages to prices, suggest that wage inflation will exert upward pressure on prices and prevent a rapid descent in the rate of in- Several participants commented on the presence of product prices rather than consumer prices in Wachter's preferred wage equation. While agreeing that consumer prices could also play a role from the supply side in determining wages, some were glad to see product prices (as measured by the private nonfarm deflator) come through as an important element in the demand curve for labor. R. A. Gordon suggested that product prices may serve a dual function in the equation, reflecting both the cost of living to workers and the profitability of firms. Robert Hall saw product prices as the price of value added, or something close to wages themselves. This squared with his view of a wage-wage, rather than a wage-price, spiral.
Franco Modigliani thought Wachter was going beyond his empirical results in explaining wages in terms of the expectations of unions. None of Wachter's equations incorporates expectations and yet they all perform quite well in explaining the coefficient of variation of wages. Modigliani preferred to interpret the variation in the gap between union and nonunion wages as the result of the different reactions the two sectors have to unemployment and inflation. Union wages reflect inflation more and unemployment less than do nonunionized wages, according to Modigliani's own empirical research.
Interpreting Wachter's results in terms of the concepts of his own paper, Hall felt that the scale wage was interpreted as if it were the effective wage. In the event of recession or boom, the two might diverge markedly. R. J. Gordon pointed to the considerable increase in the coefficient of the price-change variable in the wage equations over the last three years. In his judgment, this development called into question any econometric model that assumes constant coefficients since 1954.
